Central oxygen pipeline failure by Mostert, L & Coetzee, A R
The page number in the footer is not for bibliographic referencingwww.tandfonline.com/ojaa 32
Introduction
Anaesthetic and critical care staff play a governing role in the 
comprehension of a hospital’s oxygen delivery system and 
associated contingency plans for internal disaster management. 
Therefore, staff must be thoroughly prepared and properly 
trained to support an institution-wide emergency response in 
the event of central oxygen pipeline failure. Although routine 
checking and maintenance of anaesthetic equipment is 
increasingly delegated to non-physician staff, such as theatre 
technologists, the responsibility still remains that of the 
anaesthetist to personally complete a routine equipment check 
and to be vigilant, able and prepared to adequately manage 
equipment-related crises as they arise.
Case study
Mid-morning on 25 August 2012, a sudden, unanticipated and 
complete central oxygen pipeline failure occurred throughout 
Tygerberg Hospital. It transpired that a maintenance employee 
was welding in the presence of an unidentified oxygen leak, 
which caused an explosion and the subsequent failure of the 
main oxygen valve. This happened while I was on duty in the 
surgical intensive care unit (ICU), with two patients on full 
ventilation and four patients breathing spontaneously on 40% 
oxygen face masks. Given the number of patients in the ICU, only 
one back-up ventilator was available in the event of an additional 
need for ventilatory support. The hospital superintendent and 
the hospital’s oxygen suppliers were notified immediately. 
However, at the time it was neither apparent what the cause or 
extent of the oxygen pipeline failure was, nor when the oxygen 
supply would be restored. The ICU was inundated with requests 
for help from the various divisions of the hospital, and given the 
uncertainty around the cause of the failure and the restoration, 
there was general confusion and concern as some patients’ lives 
were in danger. 
To manage the extent and impact of the failure, the following 
actions were immediately taken. All elective procedures were 
cancelled and operating theatres placed on standby to deal with 
emergencies only. Mobile oxygen cylinders were deployed. The 
clinical technologist ordered more oxygen cylinders [10 x 700 l 
(0.94 kg) and 7 x 350 l (0.47 kg)] from the medical gas stores. At 
approximately 16h45, almost seven hours after the initial failure, 
the newly replaced main oxygen valve was slowly opened to allow 
pipeline pressure to build. However, the maximum rate of flow 
that was delivered from the wall sockets was 5 l oxygen/minute, 
with a maximum pressure of 2.7 bar (normally 3.5–4.5 bar). The 
low rate of oxygen flow and low pressure were investigated, and 
it was discovered that the main high-pressure oxygen pipeline 
had ruptured. This rupture was repaired within the next hour, 
and by 18h30 all of the technical problems relating to the central 
oxygen supply had been resolved. The oxygen pressure and 
the flow rate were once again normal. The failure of the central 
oxygen supply led to the entire hospital being without oxygen 
for approximately eight hours. Fortunately, there were no deaths 
or serious consequences for any patient as a result of the central 
oxygen pipeline failing.
The Tygerberg Hospital medical gas pipeline system consists of 
one main bulk liquid oxygen tank with a capacity of 14 tons, and 
one back-up bulk liquid oxygen tank with a capacity of six tons. 
The two tanks are linked with automatic changeover valves. This 
bulk medical oxygen supply is stored as a liquid in a vacuum-
insulated evaporator system at a cryogenic temperature. 
Ambient-heated vaporisers convert the cryogenic liquid into gas 
for distribution throughout the medical gas pipeline system.
The gas then passes through high-pressure regulators, which 
regulate the system pressure down to 1 200 kPa. Up to this point, 
the central oxygen supply system is maintained by a private 
company, with the rest of the system being the responsibility 
of the Tygerberg Hospital Engineering Department. The oxygen 
pipeline system then continues into inline regulators, which 
further reduce the pressure to 450  kPa. As a back-up, these 
regulators are interlinked with a standby manifold consisting 
of 40 oxygen cylinders (10.2  kg each). Once the pressure has 
been reduced to 450  kPa, the oxygen pipeline enters the 
hospital basement, splitting into various hospital blocks. The 
oxygen pipeline system splits into shafts to each floor in each 
of the blocks. The oxygen supply then runs along the passages 
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to the valve boxes. From the valve boxes, it flows to the oxygen 
outlets, where it is delivered to patients. There is an average of 
34 oxygen outlet points per normal ward, with up to 60 oxygen 
outlet points in selected paediatric wards. The oxygen is filled by 
African Oxygen Limited (Afrox), who also issues accompanying 
purity certificates.
The bulk oxygen tanks are fitted with both low-pressure and 
high-pressure alarm systems. When one of the alarms is triggered, 
it registers at both the Exchange Department of Tygerberg 
Hospital and at Afrox in Germiston, Gauteng. As soon as an alarm 
is activated, the standby officer at Tygerberg Hospital is notified. 
The standby officer liaises with Afrox to ensure speedy oxygen 
delivery. Low-pressure alarms are activated as soon as the bulk 
tank’s content falls below three tons. At this point, the standby 
bulk tank is filled to capacity (six tons). If there is any delay in 
filling the main bulk tank, the system automatically switches to 
the standby bulk tank with a second alarm that is triggered as 
soon as its level also falls below three tons. Should the standby 
tank also run empty, the emergency oxygen cylinder manifolds 
still remain as a back-up system. Tygerberg Hospital uses 
approximately 4.5 tons of oxygen daily. The liquid oxygen tanks 
are filled every second day. At the time of the incident, Tygerberg 
Hospital was using various types of anaesthetic machines and 
ICU ventilators (Table I).
Discussion
Central oxygen pipeline failure is a relatively rare, but potentially 
disastrous, phenomenon for any hospital. Several reports deal 
with central gas supply failure.1–19 Although these were due to 
different causes, the impact on patients and staff remains the 
same. Anaesthesiology and critical care practitioners are exposed 
to the risk of such failures, perhaps more so than other medical 
practitioners, and should therefore be adequately informed of 
and trained in the management of these emergencies. High-
fidelity patient simulation training can help to identify gaps in 
the anaesthesia curriculum and test clinicians’ responses to a 
vast number of critical equipment failure events. Training can 
assist in identifying common managerial pitfalls, and is useful 
in establishing appropriate future action protocols. Residents’ 
performance, skills and progress can be assessed and improved 
continuously without placing patients at risk.9,10
Recommendations
Prevention
Actions which can be taken to ensure the prevention of a central 
oxygen pipeline failure include the following:
•	 Simulation training of registrars.
•	 Routine checks of anaesthetic work stations and equipment by 
anaesthetists, and specifically, an awareness of the ventilator 
drive type used.
•	 Ensuring that there is an oxygen analyser for every anaesthetic 
machine, which is essential.
•	 The oxygen supply pressure failure alarm systems should be 
checked every morning before starting on any theatre case.
•	 Full reserve emergency oxygen tanks on each machine 
(properly checked and closed prior to each anaesthetic).
•	 Self-inflating ventilation equipment, e.g. an Ambu® bag, within 
easy reach.
•	 Routine evaluation of the medical gas supply systems in 
theatre.
•	 Continuous quantitative measurement of cryogenic oxygen 
tank contents. The alarm should not only be activated by a low 
volume, but also by an excessive rate of volume loss.
•	 Awareness by hospital staff of the design and function of the 
medical gas pipeline system.
•	 Effective communication between the clinical, engineering 
and commercial supplying parties.
Planning
When planning how to manage a central oxygen pipeline failure, 
the following needs to be included:
•	 A thorough disaster management plan with regard to the 
medical gas pipeline system, which includes regular, rehearsed 
mock disaster drills. Hospitals must conduct an audit of their 
central gas supply systems regarding the rate of daily oxygen 
consumption and the existence and adequacy of a back-
up system, and have a contingency plan in the event of an 
interruption.
•	 Ensuring that there are adequate oxygen cylinder supplies on 
site, as well as a contingency plan on how to obtain additional 
supplies if necessary.
Hospital design
The hospital’s design can impact on a central oxygen pipeline 
failure. The following should be carried out: 
•	 Ensure a spatial or physical barrier between the primary and 
secondary liquid oxygen supply tanks, with independent 
pipelines.
•	 Large medical centres with high oxygen consumption might 
consider having an additional reserve bulk liquid oxygen tank, 
Table 1: The anaesthetic machines and intensive care unit ventilators 
in use at the time of the central oxygen pipeline failure at Tygerberg 
Hospital
Anaesthetic machine Ventilator drive type
Dräger Julian® Descending bellows
Dräger Fabius® CE Piston
Dräger Fabius® GS Piston
Dräger Fabius® GS Premium Piston
Dräger Primus® Piston
Dräger Zeus® Turbine
ICU ventilator Ventilator drive type
Third VELA® Pressurised oxygen (2.8–6 bar)
Dräger Savina® Generates compressed air with a 
blower unit. It is able to ventilate 
without any connection to medical 
compressed air. If compressed, oxygen 
is used, whether from a wall socket 
or cylinder. A precise concentration is 
measured and delivered.
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apart from the primary and secondary supply tanks, with 
independent pipelines.
•	 Ensure prominent labelling and shielding of the oxygen feed 
lines that connect the main supply vessel to the hospital, so as 
to avert accidental interruption.
•	 Ensure that there are ample valves along the oxygen supply 
line in the hospital, so that leaks can be isolated without 
interrupting the central supply.
•	 Incorporate an external connection to the central oxygen 
piping system, to which an oxygen tanker truck could attach 
to provide emergency oxygen for the entire institution.
•	 The reserve system must be of sufficient size to supply oxygen 
for long enough before the arrival of an oxygen tanker truck 
at the hospital.
Immediate action by the anaesthetist in theatre
Immediate action must be taken by the anaesthetist in theatre 
to:20
•	 Confirm the oxygen supply failure. This covers the failure of 
oxygen alarm sounds, oxygen pressure gauge falls and oxygen 
and linked flow meter falls, emergency oxygen flush failure, 
oxygen-driven ventilators stopping and audible leaking in the 
event of a pipeline disconnection. 
•	 Turn on the reserve oxygen cylinder on machine. Check the 
pressure gauge. Is it adequately filled? Check the oxygen 
analyser and confirm the return of oxygen flow. 
•	 Close the adjustable pressure-limiting valve.
•	 Reduce fresh gas flows so that they are kept to a minimum 
(≈ 250 ml oxygen per minute).
•	 Manually ventilate via the circle system if the ventilator is 
oxygen driven.
•	 Maintain anaesthesia. Use volatile agents, where appropriate, 
as well as total intravenous anaesthesia.
•	 Ensure that there is an adequate fraction of inspired oxygen 
2 concentration.
•	 Call for additional oxygen cylinders.
•	 Disconnect the failed pipeline from the wall, and do not re-use 
it until the gas composition and quality at the wall outlet have 
been formally tested.
•	 Inform the surgeon and expedite or postpone surgery.
•	 Allocate a competent person, other than the anaesthetist, 
to manually ventilate the patient if needed, e.g. an oxygen-
driven ventilator on an anaesthetic machine.
•	 Inform personnel in other relevant hospital areas, as well as 
theatre management.
•	 Establish when the oxygen supply is likely to be restored.
•	 If the oxygen cylinder supply runs out, manually ventilate the 
patient with a self-inflating (Ambu®) bag on room air (21% 
oxygen).
Institutional operational policy in the event of central 
oxygen pipeline failure
The institutional operational policy in the event of central oxygen 
pipeline failure must incorporate the following:21–24
•	 The person who discovers the failure must inform the 
switchboard and matron on duty immediately.
•	 The switchboard must inform the hospital superintendent on 
duty, the main porter and a designated authorised person of 
the problem. (The authorised person is one who has sufficient 
technical knowledge, training and experience to fully 
understand the dangers involved in relation to the medical 
gas pipeline system.) 
•	 The details of the failure should be confirmed, i.e. the floor 
level, department, room numbers, gases involved and whether 
or not patient ventilators are in use.
•	 The switchboard must also notify personnel in all critical care 
areas.
•	 The matron on duty must determine which patients may have 
been put at risk by the failure and to arrange for immediate 
emergency medical action, where needed.
•	 Depending on the reason for the failure and its possible 
duration, the authorised person must decide on the most 
appropriate method of long-term emergency oxygen 
provision. This may involve establishing locally regulated 
cylinder supplies at ward or department entrances.
•	 Nursing and medical staff must attempt to keep oxygen 
consumption to a minimum during the emergency.
•	 Portering staff must monitor or replenish the cylinders at the 
emergency stations and at plant room emergency supply 
manifolds.
•	 The hospital pharmacy must arrange for emergency cylinder 
deliveries, as necessary.
•	 The authorised person must liaise with a designated 
competent person to complete emergency repairs to reinstate 
the oxygen supply, using the permit-to-work system. (The 
competent person has sufficient technical knowledge, training 
and experience to carry out his or her duties in a competent 
manner and to understand fully the dangers involved in 
relation to the medial gas pipeline system. The permit-to-work 
system is a form of declaration, or certificate used to control 
work on a medical gas system. Its objective is to prevent the 
inadvertent isolation of, or unauthorised work on, the gas 
system. The system states the degree of hazard involved and 
defines all services to be worked on and the points where 
isolation of the affected sections are to be carried out.)
•	 When the oxygen supply is fully restored, the authorised 
person must complete a critical incident form and report 
extensively to the hospital chief executive officer (CEO) within 
24 hours of the incident.
In situations where it is envisaged that there will be a long-term 
loss of oxygen, the hospital superintendent on duty must liaise 
with clinical colleagues, including the matron on duty, the head 
of anaesthesiology and critical care, the hospital CEO and the 
authorised person on the need to transfer critically ill patients 
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to suitable facilities, as department closure may be warranted in 
extreme events.
Conclusion
In order to ensure patient safety during a central oxygen pipeline 
failure, a systematic approach to prevent and manage such an 
event is required.  Hospital planning and disaster management 
strategies are essential. In addition, anaesthesiologists should be 
aware of and adequately trained in the practicalities of managing 
such an event to ensure that patient safety is not compromised.
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